Jay J. J. Christensen-Szalanski and Lee Roy Beach (1982), "Experience and the base-rate fallacy, "Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance, 29, 270 278.
Ruth Beyth-Marom and Hal R. Arkes (1983), "Being accurate but not necessarily Bayesian; comments on Christensen-Szalanski and Beach," Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance.
Jay J. J. Christensen-Szalanski and Lee Roy Beach (1983), "Believing is not the same as testing,"
Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance.
In Christensen-Szalanski and Beach (1982), decision maker who experienced
the relationship between the base rate (i.e., the frequency with which an
event occurred in a series of trials and diagnostic information used this
when they made judgments in this experiment. But when given the
necessary theoretical information they did not use the base rate
effectively. (In other words, people may not use Bayes rule; but with
experience, the can come close the the Bayesain solution.) Beyth-Marom and
Arkes (1983) challenge the interpretation. Rather than using Bayes
theorem, they suggest that the subjects made direct estimates of the
proportions. Christensen-Szalanski and Beach (1983), however, say that
this is compatible with their interpretation. They quote a passage from
their 1982 paper that supports this point. They also question the external
validity of studies that use quantitative word problems to study human